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REVERSE REVOLUTION:  
RUSSIA’S CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS 
 
Sarah E. Cox † 
Abstract:  Russia is experiencing a crisis that threatens the continued relevance of 
its Constitution.  This is demonstrated first by Vladimir Putin’s return to the presidency 
and the political crisis it has fueled.  Second, it is shown by the Constitution’s inability to 
remedy the political crisis due to the collapse of separation of powers and federalism in 
Russia, and severe party underdevelopment.  Part A of this note discusses Russia’s 
political crisis, namely the demise of democracy.  Part B discusses the Constitution’s 
injuries, specifically the collapse of federalism, the demise of the separation of powers, 
and the state’s party underdevelopment.  Together, these factors signify a constitutional 
crisis which can be cured only through substantive changes to the Constitution and 
Russia’s electoral laws, and a normative shift in Russian politics. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
In September 2011, Vladimir Putin, Russia’s current Prime Minister 
and former President, surprised no one when he announced that he would 
once again seek the Russian presidency.1  Later in the winter, opposition to 
his candidacy arose, and a once-inevitable outcome appeared less decided.2  
Nevertheless, initial criticism of his potential reelection manifested itself as 
little more than disgruntled complacency,3 and those opposing his reelection 
ultimately lost steam and focused less on preventing his reelection than on 
achieving incremental changes to Russia’s electoral process.4  As a result, 
Putin regained the Russian presidency in the spring of 2012 with relative 
                                                 
† J.D. expected 2013, University of Washington School of Law.  I would like to thank all of my 
peers at the Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal for their help and encouragement in preparing my article for 
publication.  In particular, I would like to thank Justin Glick, Jessica Montgomery, Joanne Kim, Alec 
Paxton, Courtney Skiles, and Alyson Palmer for their thoughtful edits and critiques.  Thanks also to Dean 
Kathryn Watts of the University of Washington School of Law, who has been an invaluable mentor to me 
throughout my time at law school.  Thanks also to Greg Cox, Annette Cox, and Emily Cox for their love 
and support. 
1 See Ellen Barry, Putin Once More Moves to Assume Top Job in Russia, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 25,   2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/25/world/europe/medvedev-says-putin-will-seek-
russian-presidency-in-2012.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=Putin%20once%20more%20moves%20to%20 
assume&st=cse. 
2 See Ellen Barry, Vast Rally in Moscow is a Challenge to Putin’s Power, N.Y. TIMES,  
Dec. 25, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/25/world/europe/tens-of-thousands-of-protesters-gather-
in-moscow-russia.html?ref=russia.   
3 See, e.g., Seth Mydans, Putin’s Eye for Power Leads Some in Russia to Ponder Life Abroad, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 1, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/02/world/europe/putins-eye-for-power-leads-some-
in-russia-to-ponder-life-abroad.html?scp=1&sq=Putin%20eye%20for%20power&st=cse.   
4 Id.   
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ease 5  and will likely remain in power until 2024, making his reign 
comparable in length to that of the average Soviet dictators.6   
Putin’s campaign and reelection should sound a warning bell for those 
who hoped Russia would eventually free itself from the grip of autocracy.  
Thus far it has not, in large part because the election, while disappointing, 
was ostensibly legal.  Consequently, some Russians have resigned 
themselves to simply leaving Russia7 and the West has begun preparing for a 
renewed but familiar strain on its relationship with the Kremlin.8   
Putin’s reelection sounds the final death knell for Russia’s 
constitution.  This is demonstrated first by Russia’s current political crisis, 
which is evidenced by an acutely unstable political climate and, ultimately, 
the demise of democracy in Russia.  Second, it is shown by the 
Constitution’s inability to remedy this crisis, caused by a breakdown in the 
Constitution’s structure and mandates, specifically the separation of powers, 
the federalist structure, and a multi-party framework. 
Part II of this note will provide an overview of the formation and 
adoption of the Russian Constitution and Putin’s rise to power.  Part III will 
discuss the symptoms of the constitutional crisis mentioned above.  It will 
describe the present political crisis, compiling and describing symptoms of 
the unstable environment, as well as analyze the breakdown of the 1993 
Constitution and its consequent inability to resolve the political crisis.  
Finally, Part IV will suggest remedies for the constitutional crisis which 
Putin’s control has created, proposing particular methods for strengthening 
the other branches of the Russian government, especially the judiciary, 
through the Constitutional Court.    
                                                 
5 Ellen Barry, Vladimir Putin Takes Helm as Police Punish Moscow Dissident, N.Y. TIMES,  
May 7, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/08/world/europe/vladimir-putin-returns-to-presidency-in-
russia.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all.   
6 For example, Leonid Brezhnev led the Communist Party, and therefore the Soviet Union, for 
eighteen years.  EDWIN BACON & MARK SANDLE, BREZHNEV RECONSIDERED 1 (Palgrave MacMillan Ltd. 
2002).  If Putin is reelected, he could obtain control of the Russian executive branch for an additional 
twelve years, per recent legislation extending presidential terms to six years.  Lucian Kim, Russia’s 
Approaching Nonelection, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/30/opinion/30iht-
edkim30.html?pagewanted=all.  Together with the eight years he has already served as President and the 
four he has served as Prime Minister this will total twenty-four years as Russia’s leader.  Furthermore, 
while a Russian President may not hold office for more than two terms in succession, nothing prevents 
Putin from moving to Prime Minister for another term and then back to President.  See KONSTITUTSIIA 
ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [KONST. RF][CONSTIUTION], § 1, ch. 4, art. 81, cl. 3 (Russ.) (“No one person shall 
hold the office of President of the Russian Federation for more than two terms in succession.”). 
7 See Mydans, supra note 3. 
8 See, e.g., David M. Herszenhorn & Ellen Barry, Putin Contends Clinton Incited Unrest Over Vote, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/09/world/europe/putin-accuses-clinton-of-
instigating-russian-protests.html?_r=1&hp=&pagewanted=print (reporting Putin’s accusations of United 
States Secretary of State Hillary Clinton for inciting outcries against Putin).   
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II. THE 1993 CONSTITUTION AND PAST POLITICAL PRACTICES HAVE 
ESTABLISHED A SUPER-PRESIDENTIALIST GOVERNMENT IN RUSSIA 
 
The demise of the Soviet Union in 1991 created the need for a leader 
who could unify Russia and bring about stability.  This section will provide 
background on the formation of Russia’s Constitution, explaining how Boris 
Yeltsin initially assumed Russia’s leadership role.  This section first 
describes how Yeltsin oversaw and largely controlled the process of drafting 
and adopting a presidentialist democratic constitution within a year of 
assuming the presidency.  Second, it explains the structure of government 
established by Yeltsin’s constitution, emphasizing in particular how it held 
the key to its own demise.  Finally, it will explain how Russia’s 
presidentialist government and Yeltsin’s “anointment” of his successor 
allowed Vladimir Putin to consolidate power and undermine the 
Constitution’s structures.   
A. The 1993 Constitution Establishes a Super-Presidentialist Democracy 
During the Soviet Union’s sharp decline in the late 1980s, the calls for 
reform by Boris Yeltsin, a young reformer and republican separatist, became 
increasingly popular.9   In 1990, he led the Russian Republic to declare 
independence from the Soviet Union and helped push then Soviet president 
Mikhail Gorbachev out of power.10  Though Gorbachev attempted to patch 
up the broken union, party extremists, the Komitet Gosudarstvennoy 
Bezopasnosti or Committee for State Security (“KGB”), and the military 
staged a coup and arrested Gorbachev.11  The coup failed, however, largely 
due to mass protests and Yeltsin’s opposition leadership. 12   Though 
Gorbachev returned to Moscow, he was politically obsolete, and Yeltsin 
easily assumed power.13 
In the spring of 1993, Yeltsin, then Russia’s president, proposed a 
new Russian constitution and presented a draft to the Russian people.14  In 
July, a Constitutional Conference comprised of two representatives from 
each Russian Federation met.15  After making over 200 amendments, the 
                                                 
9 Steve G. Marks, The Historical Context, in UNDERSTANDING CONTEMPORARY RUSSIA 78 
(Michael L. Bressler ed., Lynne Rienner Publishers 2009).   
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 Id.  
13 Id.  
14 Christina M. McPherson, Russia’s 1993 Constitution:  Rule of Law for Russia or Merely a Return 
to Autocracy?, 27 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 155, 156 (1999-2000).   
15 Id. at 157.   
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Conference approved the Constitution. 16   Concurrently, the Russian 
Congress published its own draft constitution. 17   In response, Yeltsin 
attempted to disband the Congress using the emergency powers granted to 
him via the 1978 Constitution.18  Though the Congress initially refused to 
leave power, Yeltsin eventually overcame its opposition with the support of 
the military.19  On November 9, 1993, Yeltsin proposed a new draft of his 
constitution, and declared that a popular referendum would be held to adopt 
his constitution.  Approval required 50% for adoption.20  On December 12, 
1993, Russians adopted the Constitution with 60% of the vote, and the 1993 
Constitution became Russia’s first democratic Constitution since 1906.21   
B. The Governmental Structure Enshrined in the Constitution Revolves 
Around the Executive Branch 
The government structure set forth in the 1993 Constitution has never 
been without criticism, as it focuses primarily on the strength of the 
executive and the relative weakness of the legislature and judiciary. 22  
Indeed, the 1993 Constitution represents a “presidentialist” form of 
government, which centralizes power in a strong executive, and focuses on 
stability and unity.23  The president is the head of state, and the “guarantor of 
the Constitution of the Russian Federation, and of human and civil rights and 
liberties24 and freedoms,” and the “Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the 
Armed Forces.”25  Furthermore, the president may dissolve the State Duma, 
the lowest house of the Russian legislature, if it exercises too rigidly its 
checks on the president’s power. 26   Additionally, a president is given 
substantial and virtually unchecked legislative powers,27 veto power,28 and 
the ability to impose martial law29 and states of emergency.30   
                                                 
16 Id. 
17 Id.  
18 Lee K. Metcalf, Presidential Power in the Russian Constitution, 6 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 125, 
133 (1996).   
19 See McPherson, supra note 14, at 157.   
20 Id. at 158. 
21 Id.  
22 Id. at 155. 
23 See Metcalf, supra note 18, at 125. 
24 KONSTITUTSIIA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [KONST. RF][CONSTITUTION] § 1, ch. 4, art. 80, cl. 2 
(Russ.). 
25 Id. § 1, ch. 4, art. 87, cl. 1 (Russ.).   
26 For example, the president can dissolve the State Duma if it refuses to confirm his or her candidate 
for prime minister three times, or if it expresses a no-confidence vote in the president twice in three 
months.  See McPherson, supra note 14, at 155. 
27 The president may unilaterally pass laws in the form of decrees and executive orders.  See 
KONSTITUTSIIA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [KONT. RF][CONSTITUTION] § 1, ch. 4, art. 90, cl. 2 (Russ.) (“The 
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The 1993 Constitution provides for a bicameral legislature, called the 
Federal Assembly.31  The lower house of the Federal Assembly is the State 
Duma.32  The upper house is the Federation Council, which is comprised of 
two councilors for each member of the federation.33  The 1993 Constitution 
also calls for a popularly-elected president limited to two consecutive four-
year terms.34   
Additionally, the Constitution sets up a judiciary,35 which includes a 
Constitutional Court, 36  a Supreme Court, 37  and a Supreme Arbitration 
Court.38  At the request of the President, the State Duma, one-fifth of the 
members of the Federation Council or deputies of the State Duma, the 
Supreme Court, the Supreme Arbitration Court, or the local bodies of 
government, the Constitutional Court may resolve cases about compliance 
with the Constitution of the Russian Federation.39  The Supreme Arbitration 
Court of the Russian Federation resolves economic and other disputes 
considered by arbitration courts, supervising their compliance with federal 
legal procedures.40  The Supreme Court is the highest body adjudicating 
civil, criminal, administrative and other matters triable by general 
jurisdiction courts, and supervises other courts’ compliance with federal 
procedural forms.41 
                                                                                                                                                
decrees and orders of the President of the Russian Federation shall be binding throughout the territory of 
the Russian Federation.”).   
28 The president exercises this power by keeping a law unsigned and unreturned for as long as he or 
she wishes.  See Metcalf, supra note 18, at 135. 
29 KONSTITUTSIIA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [KONST. RF][CONSTITUTION] § 1, ch. 5, art. 87, cl. 2 
(Russ.) (“In the event of aggression against the Russian Federation or an immediate threat thereof, the 
President of the Russian Federation shall introduce martial law on the territory of the Russian Federation or 
in areas thereof with immediate notification thereof of the Federation Council and the State Duma.”).   
30 Id. § 1, ch. 5, art. 88 (“Under the circumstances and procedures envisaged by the Federal 
Constitutional Law, the President of the Russian Federation shall impose a state of emergency on the 
territory of the Russian Federation or in areas thereof with immediate notification of the Federation Council 
and the State Duma.”).   
31 See Metcalf, supra note 18, at 134.   
32 Id. 
33 Id.  
34 KONSTITUTSIIA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [KONST. RF][CONSTITUTION] § 1, ch. 4, art. 81, cl. 1 
(Russ.) (“The President of the Russian Federation shall be elected for a term of four years by the citizens of 
the Russian Federation on the basis of general, equal and direct vote by secret ballot.”); Id. § 1, ch. 4, art. 
81, cl. 3 (“No one person shall hold the office of President of the Russian Federation for more than two 
terms in succession.”).   
35 Id. § 1, ch. 7.   
36 Id. § 1, ch. 7, art. 125. 
37 Id. § 1, ch. 7, art. 126. 
38 Id. § 1, ch. 7, art. 127.   
39 Id. § 1, ch. 7, art. 125, cl. 2.   
40 KONSTITUTSIIA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [KONST. RF][CONSTITUTION] § 1, ch. 7, art. 127.   
41 Id. § 1, ch. 7, art. 126.   
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While the constitutional provisions described above seem to beg for a 
dictator, the Constitution also outlines restraints to the president’s power.  
For example the president may be removed if the State Duma concludes that 
the president has committed treason or another “grave crime,” the Supreme 
Court qualifies the actions as criminal, or the Constitutional Court concludes 
that the proper procedures have been followed.  The Federation Council 
must adopt an impeachment decision by two-thirds vote within three months 
of either of the requisite accusations.42   
Additionally, the State Duma can request a determination by the 
Constitutional Court of the constitutionality of a law, including those 
promulgated through executive decrees and orders.  The State Duma must 
approve any presidential decrees imposing martial law or a state of 
emergency, 43  and must consent to the President’s appointment of the 
Chairman of the Government.44  The checks on presidential power have 
allowed at least the trappings of the structure of government established by 
the Constitution to remain durable over the past eighteen years.  
Nevertheless, as discussed in Part III.A, its institutional structure created an 
environment ripe for a return to autocracy. 
 
C. Yeltsin’s “Anointment” of Putin Ensured Putin’s Rise to and 
Consolidation of Power 
 
Although he began his presidency as a purported compromiser 
interested in establishing democracy, Boris Yeltsin undermined his own 
rhetoric and the democratic principles outlined in his 1993 Constitution by 
relinquishing his power to Putin in 1999, before the expiration of his term.45  
In doing so, he undermined free and broad campaigning by leveraging his 
popularity to name a successor.46  This created a shortened campaign period, 
                                                 
42 See Metcalf, supra note 18, at 134.   
43 KONSTITUTSIIA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [KONST. RF][CONSTITUTION] § 1, ch. 5, art. 102, cl. 1. 
(Russ.) (“The jurisdiction of the Federation Council shall include: . . . b) approval of the decree of the 
President of the Russian Federation on the introduction of martial law; c) approval of the decree of the 
President of the Russian Federation on the introduction of a state of emergency.”). 
44 Id. § 1, ch. 6, art. 111, cl. 1.  The Chairman of the Government acts as liaison between the 
executive branch and the other branches of government, overseeing the general workings of the 
government.  See generally, id. § 1, ch. 6 (requiring the Chairman of the Government to propose the 
structure of the federal branches of executive power, determine guidelines of the government’s work, and 
to develop the budget of the government).  
45 See JOEL M. OSTROW, GEORGIY A. SATAROV, & IRINA M. KHAKAMADA, THE CONSOLIDATION OF 
DICTATORSHIP IN RUSSIA:  AN INSIDE VIEW OF THE DEMISE OF DEMOCRACY 79 (Greenwood Publ’g Grp. 
2007).   
46 Id. 
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forcing his supporters to go along with his decision. 47   It also caused 
unprepared parties to surrender their hopes for potential campaigns, 
frustrating any possibility of true political competition. 48   Additionally, 
Yeltsin’s conspicuous involvement in the campaign and relentless support 
for Putin effectively quashed any possibility of a free and fair election.49  
Worst of all, Yeltsin’s anointment of Putin set a precedent for commending 
successors, a practice on which Putin would later capitalize.   
Russians were unfamiliar with Vladimir Putin, the loyal former KGB 
agent selected to succeed Yeltsin.50  Indeed, before winning the presidency, 
he had never been elected to public office.51  He had spent his early career as 
a KGB agent in East Germany, returning to Russia in 1990 to work in 
politics.52  In 1996, he found work in Yeltsin’s presidential administration 
through personal connections, and Yeltsin named him director of the Federal 
Security Service in 1998.53  Recognizing Putin’s steadfast loyalty, Yeltsin 
nominated and the Duma confirmed Putin as Prime Minister in August of 
1999, less than a year before the presidential election.54  He was easily 
elected in 2000.55  As discussed below, Putin’s reign has been characterized 
by impermanent political stability achieved through a strong state achieved 
predominantly via a strong Kremlin.56  Gradually, Putin has ensured that 
Russia’s executive controls politics, the economy, and society in general.57  
He has thus preserved and strengthened Russia’s “super-presidential 
system,” but in doing so has created a constitutional crisis.   
III. PUTIN’S REIGN HAS CAUSED A CONSTITUTION CRISIS IN RUSSIA 
 
Russia is experiencing a constitutional crisis that has crippled the 
relevance of the 1993 Constitution, which technically remains in effect 
today.  This crisis is exposed first by a political crisis, evidenced by Putin’s 
continued grasp on power and the resultant failure of democratic functions in 
                                                 
47 Id.  
48 Id.  
49 Id. 
50 MICHAEL MCFAUL, NIKOLAI PETROV, & ANDREI RYABOV, BETWEEN DICTATORSHIP AND 
DEMOCRACY:  RUSSIAN POST-COMMUNIST POLITICAL REFORM 295 (Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace 2004).   
51 See Michael L. Bressler, Politics, in UNDERSTANDING CONTEMPORARY RUSSIA 105 (Michael L. 
Bressler ed., Lynne Rienner Publishers 2009).   
52 Id.  
53 Id. at 106.  
54 Id.  
55 Id. at 109. 
56 Id. at 110-11. 
57 Bressler, supra note 51 at 110-11. 
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Russia.  Second, political crises such as the collapse of the separation of 
powers and federalism and the rise of single-party politics expose the 
Constitution’s ineffective means for dealing with such crises.  
This section discusses each of these factors in turn.  Part A discusses 
the political crisis (i.e., the demise of democracy), and Part B discusses the 
Constitution’s failures (i.e., the collapse of separation of powers and 
federalism and political party underdevelopment).  Together, these factors 
signify a constitutional crisis that can be remedied only through substantive 
changes to the Constitution and Russia’s elections laws, and an attitudinal 
change by the Russian people. 
 
A. Putin’s Actions Throughout his First Presidency Compromised 
Democracy in Russia and Led to a Political Crisis  
 
Putin’s continued control, particularly his renewed candidacy and 
likely reelection, has shattered the democratic political structures required by 
the 1993 Constitution.  Indeed, he has executed a disconcertingly rapid 
movement toward autocracy in Russia.  He accomplished this transition in 
three ways.  First, he tightly restricted and largely crippled Russia’s free 
media.  Second, he has undermined the democracy of regional elections.  
Third, facilitated in part by his predecessor, he ensured that presidential 
elections are neither free nor fair.  Together, these factors indicate that 
despite the 1993 Constitution’s democratic mandate, Russia is now 
undeniably autocratic, with one party, indeed one person, controlling 
essentially every level and aspect of government.   
1. Putin Stifled the Free Media During his First Presidency 
Freedom of the press and media is crucial to the development and 
maintenance of civil society. 58   Unfortunately, despite his claims of 
commitment to democracy, in one of his first moves as President, Putin 
forcefully reigned in Russia’s media, which he publicly criticized for its 
supposedly “unpatriotic” tendencies. 59   He did this first by creating the 
Information Security Doctrine, an executive order severely restricting 
freedom of information.60  Second, using members of the judiciary whom he 
largely controlled,61 Putin used the courts to attack critical and independent 
                                                 
58 Louis Skyner, Public Power and Private Interests: the Media, the Law and Democracy in Russia, 
4 PERSP. ON EUR. POL. & SOC’Y, 265, 271 (2003).   
59 See MCFAUL, PETROV, & RYABOV, supra note 50, at 295.   
60 Id. at 189.   
61 Id.   
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media empires.62  For example, he threatened and eventually quashed state 
critic Vladimir Gusinsky, the majority shareholder of Russia’s NTV, one of 
the few remaining independent media companies, with frivolous criminal 
charges.63  Third, Putin capitalized on conflicts between another prominent 
independent media company’s shareholders, closing it under a façade of 
financial failure.64  The effect of these moves has been the downfall of 
independent Russian media and the silencing of would-be Putin critics.65   
2. Putin Undermined the Democracy of Regional Elections in his First 
Presidency 
Since Putin’s election in 2000, the democratic integrity of regional 
elections in Russia has been severely compromised.66   In particular, the 
Kremlin has interfered extensively with local elections, ensuring that the 
outcomes of local electoral systems are dictated predominantly by the 
state.67  Furthermore, in 2004, Putin used his political power to push through 
amendments to the electoral system that “dealt a serious blow to the 
development of democracy.”68   These amendments constrain burgeoning 
opposition parties’ ability to participate in elections, and increased United 
Russia’s success in local elections.69  For example, to be a legally registered 
party, a political group must now have at least 50,000 members and regional 
members in over half of the population.70  The effect of this law is to make 
certain that minority political factions are unable to gain the strength or leg 
required to challenge the already-entrenched parties.71  This effect is shown 
by the fact that the vast majority of local elections only include the four 
parties that currently hold seats in the State Duma.72 
Further weakening the democratic nature of regional elections is the 
fact that only the party that wins the most seats in a regional legislature has 
                                                 
62 Id.   
63 Id.   
64 Id.  
65 Id.   
66 See generally, Cameron Ross, Regional Elections and Electoral Authoritarianism in Russia, 63 
EUR.-ASIA STUD. 641 (2011) (finding that “[e]lections in Russia’s regions are more often instruments of 
authoritarian rule than instruments of democracy and the electoral rules of the game have been designed to 
favour United Russia”).   
67 Id. at 642.  Specifically, local electoral systems are “first past the post single mandate” elections.  
This means that whoever gets the most votes, regardless of whether he or she has a majority of the votes, 
wins.  Consequently, larger parties (presumably with greater resources) gain a disproportionately large 
number of seats.   
68 Id. at 643.   
69 Id.  
70 Federal’nyi Zakon Federal Law, No. 168, Dec. 20, 2004.   
71 See Ross, supra note 66, at 644.   
72 Id.  
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the right to nominate candidates for the post of governor, and also the fact 
that the President now must approve the candidate nominated. 73   This 
ensures governors’ affiliation with the Kremlin, as United Russia has a 
majority in eighty-one of Russia’s eighty-three local legislatures. 74  
Additionally, via the “Law on Combating Extremist Activity,” an increased 
number of state officials are now permitted to serve on electoral 
commissions, and the government can now ban parties from elections if any 
of its members have been charged with “extremist activities.”75  This law 
may be and likely is used to frustrate challenges by potential renegade 
candidates.76   
Changes to electoral law under Putin have predominantly abolished 
the “votes against all” category from ballots, whereby a citizen can 
demonstrate his or her disapproval of the electoral system. 77   This has 
silenced one of the few remaining opportunities for a citizen to voice his or 
her disapproval of the Kremlin’s candidates and to the process in general.  
Furthermore, minimum turnout thresholds have been abolished. 78   This 
means that parties’ candidates can win without anybody showing up to 
exercise his or her franchise.79   
Finally, in a comprehensive empirical analysis of Russia’s regional 
elections, political scientist Cameron Ross80  found that, overall, regional 
elections do not provide voters with a genuine choice of competing 
candidates and parties, registration and voting procedures are exclusive, 
inaccessible, and are fraught with government and party control, 
intimidation, and abuse.81  In addition, Ross found that citizens are not free 
to cast their votes in secret or without pressure and coercion from the state, 
elections are not conducted fairly, ballots are not fairly counted and the 
results of elections do not reflect the true will of the electorate.82  Together, 
these data points demonstrate that, despite the 1993 Constitution’s 
democratic mandate, Russian regional elections are now disturbingly 
undemocratic.  
                                                 
73 Id. at 645.   
74 Id.  
75 Federal Law, No. 107, July 12, 2006.  
76 See Ross, supra note 66, at 647. 
77 Id.   
78 Id.   
79 Id.  
80 Cameron Ross is a political scientist and professor in Russian Politics at the University of Dundee.  
See Ross, supra note 66, at 641. 
81 Id. at 659-60.   
82 Id. 
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B. The Democracy of Presidential Elections Has Been Severely 
Weakened by Presidential Anointments Since Russia Adopted the 
1993 Constitution 
Executive control has undermined the liberty of Russia’s elections 
since the adoption of the 1993 Constitution, particularly since Putin’s 
election.  In most democracies, free elections function to legitimize rulers, 
articulate the voters’ will, provide insight into public opinion, and establish a 
stable government.83  In new democracies, free elections also serve to bolster 
and ease the transition from autocracy to democracy.84  In 1999 and early 
2000, however, first Yeltsin moved immediately away from the 
Constitution’s democratic mandate for elections by setting a precedent for 
undemocratic Presidential elections.  Specifically, his over-involvement in 
the campaign and relentless support for Putin debilitated Putin’s 
challengers.85  More importantly, however, his anointment of Putin set a 
precedent for commending successors, a practice which Putin himself 
capitalized on.86  Indeed, one study found that 90% of voters who voted for 
Medvedev considered Putin’s endorsement of Medvedev either important or 
very important to their voting decision.   
When he neared the end of his first term as President, Putin mirrored 
the undemocratic actions of his predecessor by publicly supporting and 
effectively anointing Dmitri Medvedev as his successor.87  Recent Russian 
President Dmitri Medvedev’s 2008 election was fraught with involvement 
by the Kremlin, and was not free, fair, or democratic.88  Indeed, it has been 
called the “most highly managed political event in Russia’s post-communist 
history.” 89   Medvedev was nominated in December 2007, shortly after 
United Russia gained an overwhelming victory in parliamentary elections.90  
When accepting his nomination, he said that he would run for president only 
if Putin would serve as prime minister if elected. 91   Russian citizens 
understood Medvedev as Putin’s mentee, and the Kremlin relentlessly tied 
his candidacy to his relationship with Putin. 92   For example, the state-
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controlled media constantly covered Medvedev and Putin’s travels together, 
and huge billboards of the two walking shoulder-to-shoulder hung in city 
squares across the country, including the square outside the Kremlin. 93  
More frighteningly, advisors to the Kremlin leaked information that 
Medvedev was taking classes to learn to speak and walk like Putin.94   
For voters, electing Medvedev meant continuing Putin’s policies.  
Nevertheless, the Kremlin felt that it needed to go further to secure 
Medvedev’s election.  Putin moved also to ensure that Medvedev had other 
unfair advantages, and he and his supporters largely orchestrated 
Medvedev’s election.95  First, media loyal to Putin ensured that coverage of 
the election was asymmetric, heavily favoring the state’s political views.96  
While there were anti-regime critics and opposition coverage by websites, 
most Russians obtained information through the state-controlled television.97  
Furthermore, the government constrained opposition parties’ opportunities 
for garnering votes, almost completely shutting them out of all positions of 
true influence.98  Ultimately the only other major parties to successfully 
place candidates on the ballot were the Communist Party and the Liberal 
Democratic Party of Russia (“LDPR”), both of which nominated the same 
party leaders they had since 1996.99  When Russian voters went to the polls 
in 2008, they had only one viable option. 
The 2012 campaign largely mirrored that of Putin in 2000 and 
Medvedev in 2008.  First, Medvedev reciprocated his own anointment by 
choosing to step aside to allow Putin to regain the presidency, rather than 
run for a second term.100  The move was a significant political sacrifice for 
Medvedev, who is now perceived to have been a weak pawn in a complex 
political arrangement.101  Moreover, Putin won a landslide victory, and his 
competition remained symbolic at best.102  It now appears likely that his 
reelection will further entrench Russia’s government in autocracy.   
Since Putin’s first election, Russia has transitioned from the 
democracy the Constitution purported to create in 1993 to an autocracy.  
This move was achieved and is demonstrated in three ways.  First, it was 
achieved through the restriction of the freedom of the press, which is now 
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nearly nonexistent.  Instead, as described above in Part III.A.1, it is largely 
state-controlled.  This has ensured that the Russian people receive their 
information predominantly from the Kremlin.  Second, the move away from 
democracy was achieved by diluting the democracy of regional elections.  
As described above, changes to the regional electoral system since Putin’s 
election have ensured that the Kremlin’s adversaries are unable to truly 
challenge its allies.  Third, and facilitated in part by Yeltsin, presidential 
elections in Russia are now neither free nor fair.  Not only have all Russian 
presidents “anointed” their successors, but also the state-controlled media 
and Kremlin election control have guaranteed that Russian voters do not 
have a true choice when it comes time to cast their ballots.  Together, these 
factors indicate that despite the 1993 Constitution’s democratic mandate, 
Russia is now undeniably autocratic. 
IV. THE COLLAPSE OF THE 1993 CONSTITUTION’S STRUCTURAL 
SAFEGUARDS HAS CRIPPLED ITS ABILITY TO REMEDY RUSSIA’S 
POLITICAL CRISIS 
 
As it currently stands, Russia’s 1993 Constitution can do nothing to 
remedy the state’s rejection of the political system it establishes.  Its 
helplessness in this regard is revealed first by the collapse of separation of 
powers enshrined in the Constitution, which normally should function as a 
check against autocratic rule.  Second, the Constitution’s inability to remedy 
the crisis is exacerbated by the state’s now feeble federalism, which should 
also check against despotic state rule.  Finally, severe party 
underdevelopment and political apathy in Russia now work to preserve its 
autocratic state, crippling a last-resort check on autocracy.  Together, the 
breakdown of these constitutional structures demonstrates that Russia is 
experiencing a constitutional crisis, in that the 1993 Constitution can do 
nothing to prevent Putin and United Russia’s continued grip on power for 
the foreseeable future.   
A. Putin’s Presidency Undermined the Separation of Powers in Russia 
The 1993 Constitution establishes a tripartite government structure 
comprised of a president and the accompanying executive branch, a 
bicameral legislature, and the judiciary.103  The judiciary is composed of the 
Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, the Supreme Arbitration Court of 
the Russian Federation, and the Constitutional Court of the Russian 
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Federation.104  While the Constitution establishes a “presidentialist” form of 
government which centralizes power in a strong executive, it nevertheless 
separates the legislative, executive, and judicial powers.105  In constitutional 
systems, separating the powers of government operates as a structural “back-
up system,” designed to prevent political actors from evading the democratic 
system the Constitution creates.106   Unfortunately, the 1993 Constitution 
contained the keys to the demise of Russia’s separation of powers, and the 
legislative and judicial branches of the government now largely serve at the 
pleasure of the President.   
The divisions of power between the executive branch and the State 
Duma has been obscured, and indeed, eliminated since Putin’s 2000 
election. 107   This has been achieved by United Russia, Putin’s political 
affiliate, gaining and maintaining a huge majority in the State Duma.108  
Indeed, in the Fourth Duma (2003-2007), United Russia held a two-thirds 
majority.109  In the December 2007 election, preceding Medvedev’s March 
2008 election, United Russia gained even more seats.110  The last decade has 
thus solidified United Russia as Russia’s party, in both the executive and 
legislative branches.  This has allowed Putin to push through his legislative 
agenda111 without much effort, and often before potential opponents have an 
opportunity to thwart it.112   
Putin and United Russia have ensured that the dominant party’s 
members in parliament vote according to the executive’s will primarily 
through political patronage.113  This is evidenced by the fact that the last 
decade in the State Duma has seen remarkable cohesiveness in voting among 
United Russia’s representatives. 114   Specifically, United Russia has 
experienced staggeringly high levels of voting discipline in the last decade 
(voting in line with party preferences), which has increased since 1994.115  
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Furthermore, United Russia has accumulated immense power since Putin’s 
election–forming unofficial “deputy groups” within its own party rather than 
establishing separate parties for voters to choose between.116   
Further solidifying the interconnectedness of the executive and 
legislative branches in Russia is the fact that polarization between the two 
branches has declined sharply since the 1990s.117  In 2001, the Unity party 
and the Fatherland–All Russia (“OVR”) party combined to form what is now 
known as United Russia.  Furthermore, United Russia allied with the 
People’s Deputy and Russia’s Regions parties to form the “coalition of 
four.”118  The untied parties voted together, and Putin used their majority to 
enact his agenda. 119   Putin also capitalized on the precarious economic 
condition in Russia, arguing that a failure to enact his legislative agenda 
would sentence Russia to permanent economic recession.120   
During the Fourth Duma, United Russia established nearly 
unmatchable control over the Duma.  Putin used his affiliation with United 
Russia to centralize political power, ending the independence of regional 
governors, controlling the mass media as described above, neutralizing 
opposition parties (described below), and reducing the parliament’s 
accountability.121  As with most autocracies in which opposition may slow 
legislation, the State Duma became remarkably productive in the Fourth 
Duma, passing 1,000 laws.122  This reflects the consolidation of power under 
United Russia and its remarkable control over the legislative agenda.  
Further emphasizing this point is the fact that Putin signed nearly everything 
the Duma passed. 123   Additionally, the Duma readily enacted Putin’s 
initiatives which centralized power and undermined democracy.  For 
example, one initiative it passed restricted the conditions under which 
citizens can hold demonstrations and another makes it more difficult for 
citizens’ initiative groups to organize nationwide referendums.124   
Putin further expunged the line between presidential policy and 
legislation in his second term, capitalizing in large part on 2004 terrorist 
attacks on the Moscow subway.125  For example, the legislature passed the 
bill, described above, providing for presidential appointment of governors in 
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the wake of the 2004 terrorist attacks.126  Moreover, in a move highlighting 
Putin’s now undeniable control over the Duma, Putin met with the 
legislature in 2005, assigning it fifteen tasks for passing the policy initiatives 
he had presented in his April message to parliament. 127   This move 
demonstrated Putin’s control over Russian legislative policy and the collapse 
of the Constitution’s division of powers between the President and 
parliament.   
Like the parliament, the judiciary has failed to exert a check on the 
President and reinforce the separation of powers and federalist structures 
established in the Constitution.  This failure has largely been due to the 
judiciary’s lack of compliance with the Constitutional Court’s rulings, as 
well as the public’s perception of the judiciary’s weakness.128  Consequently, 
and predominantly due to the weakness of the Russian Constitutional Court, 
the judiciary arguably embodies a tool for legitimization of the President’s 
agenda.  Russia’s Constitutional Court reviews the constitutionality of laws 
in Russia, ensuring compliance with the Constitution and governmental 
structures. 129   Nevertheless, the Russian Constitutional Court has been 
unable to protect the individual rights laid out in the country’s Constitution, 
and, more importantly, unable to combat the incremental legislation 
centralizing power in the President. 130   This inability has been caused 
primarily by noncompliance with its decisions.  Indeed, the Constitutional 
Court has constantly combated failure to comply with its directives, and the 
Kremlin under both Yeltsin and Putin failed to implement numerous 
decisions on basic rights.131   
Widespread ignorance by the Russian populace of the Court’s actions 
has weakened its power.132  These factors have likely led to a cycle that 
works to further weaken the Constitutional Court, and causing further 
noncompliance due to its perceived weakness.133  Thus, while the supposed 
guardian of the Constitution’s structures, the Constitutional Court remains 
largely peripheral in the Russian government, and may have only the 
influence it is granted by the Kremlin.   
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B. Putin’s Presidential Policies Led to the Collapse of Federalism in 
Russia 
Federalism is another back-up system designed to protect democratic 
political structure from domination by the state and its favored party in 
constitutional democracies. 134   Constitutional democracies that set up 
federations presume that powers will be divided between a central 
government and subnational governments.135  As described above, Article 1 
of the 1993 Constitution establishes Russia as a “federation,” a “democratic 
federative rule-of-law state with a republican form of government.” 136  
Russia’s federal system is divided into eighty-three “subjects” that are in 
turn divided into twenty-one republics, forty-six provinces, nine territories, 
four autonomous “areas,” one autonomist oblast, and two federal cities.137  
At the second level of government there are seven federal “super districts” 
(Okrugs) which were created by Putin to check the power of regional 
governors. 138   Despite this structure and the Constitution’s federalist 
mandate, Putin’s presidency has marked the centralization of power in 
Russia and a move toward a quasi-unitary, rather than federal, state. 139  
Additionally, while some hoped that President Medvedev might move away 
from Putin’s centralist policies, he did not do so during his presidency.140   
In his first move away from federalism, Putin oversaw the passage of 
legislation that reigned in regional governors, ensuring that they now serve 
at the pleasure of the President.  First, he pushed through legislation that 
requires Presidential approval of candidates nominated for governor, and 
gave the President the power to appoint governors.141  Furthermore, through 
United Russia, he shepherded the reigning in of regional governors, 
gradually enticing them through patronage, coercion, fraud, oppression, and 
elite cohesion, to join his ranks.142  These changes have jeopardized, and 
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largely undermined the independence of regional governments and provided 
for the consolidation of the Russian government under the Kremlin.143    
Second, the upper chamber of Russia’s legislature, the Russian 
Federation Council, no longer serves to accommodate regional interests, and 
instead is controlled by the Kremlin.144  Putin accomplished this through 
changes to the composition of the Council of the Federation, particularly by 
requiring that the president appoint formerly elected gubernatorial 
representatives, rather than allowing the people to elect their 
representative. 145   Technically, this requirement did not violate the 
Constitution.  While it does require that two representatives from each 
component of the federation are elected to the Council, it does not prescribe 
a method for choosing the representatives.146  These changes ensured a new 
composition of the Council of Federation, which has been reflected in the 
compliance and passivity of the upper chamber of the Council.147 
Further entrenching the power of the federal government, and in order 
to exert control over the people, Putin also created the office of the 
polnomochennyi predstavitel’ prezidenta (“polpredy”), a “plenipotentiary 
representative of the president,” for each of the seven super-districts in 
Russia. 148   The polpredy oversee the seven Russian districts, and are 
considered watchdogs of the president, supervising implementation of 
federal laws and providing information to the president.149  Five of the first 
seven polpredy had experience in the military or security forces.150   
The above changes, although each technically constitutional, have 
altered the governmental structures in Russia, crippling the federalist system 
the Constitution creates.  To this end, changes made under Putin ultimately 
allowed him to consolidate power to the executive.  This, in turn, has 
severely undermined the Constitution’s effectiveness in remedying the 
political crisis using its federalist check.  
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C. Chronic Party Underdevelopment Has Undermined the Constitution’s 
Ability to Remedy Russia’s Political Crisis 
Another widely recognized pillar of democracy is the existence of 
political parties. 151   Nevertheless, and despite the 1993 Constitution’s 
preservation of a “multi-party system,”152 parties have failed to significantly 
influence Russian politics under Putin’s regime.153  United Russia operates 
predominantly to serve the President’s wishes.154  Indeed, other parties in 
Russia have exerted little influence over Russia’s presidents, prime 
ministers, and the Federation Council, and only moderate to little influence 
over the State Duma.155  
Despite ostensible party affiliation by Putin and other presidential 
candidates, parties have not played a significant role in presidential politics 
since the adoption of the 1993 Constitution.156  Neither Medvedev nor Putin 
ever affiliated with a party.157   Additionally, President Yeltsin distanced 
himself from parties, including those that supported him.158  Furthermore, 
parties have rarely played a role even for candidates who were not elected.159  
Indeed, in 1991, only the third-place candidate had a real party affiliation. 160  
In 1996, three of five serious candidates were affiliated with a party.161  
Parties have also played little role in the legislature.162  They have 
failed almost completely to infiltrate the Federation Council, the 
legislature’s upper house.163  However, they have played a real role in the 
State Duma.164  Indeed, four different parties competed in every State Duma 
election in the 1990s.165  Nevertheless, the State Duma is the lowest chamber 
of the legislature and less powerful than the Federation Council.166  That no 
new party has managed to challenge these four established parties 
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exacerbates this problem.167  Consequently, even in the State Duma, parties 
play a small role in comparison to the role played by parties in other 
democratic countries.168   
Parties have not successfully reached much of Russia’s population.169  
For example, a survey conducted in 2004 indicated that only United Russia 
(the party Putin has the most ties to) has made an impact on the Russian 
people.170  Furthermore, only about 10% of people reported having ever 
spoken with a party.171  Additionally, evidence shows that the people are 
simply inclined to accept Putin’s policy approaches. 172   This perhaps 
contributes to the disconnection they feel with political parties in general.173   
Separation of powers, federalism, and the development of political 
parties, accomplished through incremental, technically constitutional 
legislation, have failed in Russia and have crippled the 1993 Constitution.  
Consequently, the Constitution is unable to bring about a return to the 
democratic political structure it set out to create, and instead ensures that the 
President remains the center of the government and that the other branches 
cater to his will.  Together, the failure of democracy and the failure of the 
Constitution to save democracy demonstrate that the Russia is experiencing 
a constitutional crisis.    
V. THE RESTORATION OF DEMOCRACY AND INSTITUTIONAL SAFEGUARDS 
CAN REMEDY RUSSIA’S CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS 
Despite the dire picture painted in Parts II and III, recent 
developments indicate that the situation in Russia is not as dire as it might 
appear.  It is potentially remediable.174  Indeed, there is reason to believe that 
Russia’s Constitution and political system could be revitalized through 
political and legal reform.175  The failure of democracy could be resolved 
first by restoring free media and developing other media outlets in Russia.  
Second, it could be achieved by restoring free and fair regional elections in 
Russia.  Third, it could be achieved by restoring free and fair presidential 
election.  The inability of the 1993 Constitution to remedy the political crisis 
should be resolved by reinstating its institutional safeguards, namely the 
                                                 
167 MCFAUL, PETROV, & RYABOV, supra note 50, at 111.   
168 Id.  
169 See Bressler, supra note 51, at 120.   
170 Id.  
171 Id.  
172 Id. at 121.   
173 Id.  
174 Id. 
175 See Bressler, supra note 51, at 120.  
JANUARY 2013 REVERSE REVOLUTION 199
separation of powers, federalism, and multi-party development.  This section 
will show how each of these solutions can salvage the 1993 Constitution.   
A. A Revival of Free Media and Return to Free Elections Will Help 
Strengthen and Restore Democracy in Russia 
Russia’s political crisis exists in part because in silencing his critics 
Putin undermined free elections.  These changes have effectively killed 
democracy in Russia, resulting in a political crisis.  Nevertheless, Russia’s 
political crisis could and should be remedied by restoring the freedom of the 
press and renewing the democratic nature of regional and presidential 
election.  Specifically, Russian dissidents could overcome Putin’s monopoly 
on traditional media by organizing and voicing their dissatisfaction through 
online media and social networking sites.  Furthermore, Russians should 
restore the democracy of regional elections and presidential elections by 
eliminating “first-past-the-post” regional elections, adding a “votes against 
all” category to ballots, and establishing minimum turnout thresholds.  
Finally, free and fair presidential elections could be restored by abolishing 
the practice of anointing successors, press coverage of covering opposition 
candidates, and minimizing state involvement in campaigns. 
1. Russians Should Overcome Putin’s Monopoly on Traditional Media by 
Capitalizing on Online Media and Social Networking Sites 
Russian citizens should help remedy Russia’s political crisis as can 
leaders committed to democracy political strength by voicing dissatisfaction 
with the status quo.  Protests in the winter of 2011 and 2012 indicated that 
this remedy is reasonable, and that Russian citizens may not be as 
complacent as some Western commentators have assumed them to be, and 
may no longer tolerate the defecation of their Constitution and the structures 
it sets out to safeguard.176  Indeed, in December 2011, “tens of thousands of 
citizens” protested in Moscow for a huge antigovernment demonstration.177  
The protests were the first of their type since Putin obtained the Presidency 
in 2000.178  To ensure that such dissidents are heard, any media that remains 
free should cover the protests and ensure that their messages are 
disseminated.  Because of the comprehensive state control 179  this may 
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require the use of untraditional media sources such as online dissemination, 
specifically, informal blogs and coverage by international sources.   
Dissidents’ voices, stemmed in large part by the December 2011 
protests, may be gaining traction, indicating that mobilization of the Russian 
people may indeed be working slowly to remedy the political crisis.180  This 
is demonstrated by recent parliamentary elections, which may represent a 
move away from autocratic control of United Russia.181  Indeed, in those 
elections, United Russia barely maintained a 50% majority, with three 
minority parties now represented in parliament.182  This may indicate that the 
people will no longer acquiesce to Putin and United Russia’s unbridled 
power, and that Russia still contains remnants of democracy.183   
Recent revolutions and protests in Africa and the Middle East indicate 
that use of social networking sites and nontraditional online media may be a 
viable option for voicing opposition to the Kremlin and bringing about a 
return to democracy.184  For example, social media proved a valuable tool 
for organizing opposition to Egypt’s President Mubarak in the summer of 
2011, allowing for mass protests and a relatively peaceful revolution.185  
Thus, while Russians may be unable to use traditional media outlets, social 
networking sites could be a way to overcome Putin’s monopoly on the 
media. 
President Putin and Prime Minister Medvedev continue to pay lip 
service to democracy. 186   For example, in 2010, Putin defended his 
commitment to democracy, saying that Americans “first elect the electors 
and then they vote for the presidential candidates,” but that in Russia “the 
president is elected through the direct vote of the whole population,” which, 
“might be even more democratic.”187  Furthermore, President Medvedev has 
repeatedly reiterated his own commitment to democracy, going so far as to 
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call for reforms of Russia’s political system.188  This indicates that, despite 
their actions otherwise, even the most staunchly undemocratic Russian 
leaders might respond to outcry from the people.   
2. The Freedom of Regional Elections Can be Restored by Eliminating 
“First-Past-the-Post” Votes, Adding a “Votes Against All” Category to 
Ballots, and Establishing Minimum Voter Turnout Thresholds 
 Several changes to regional elections will help restore the democracy 
of regional elections.  First, the elimination of “first-past-the-post” voting, 
the addition of a “votes against all” category to ballots, and the use of 
minimum turnout thresholds will help put democracy back into democratic 
elections.  “First-past-the-post,” single mandate voting in regional elections, 
in which whoever gets the most votes wins, has allowed already-powerful 
parties to maintain control and thwart minority parties.189  Consequently, this 
form of voting should be eliminated and replaced with absolute majority rule 
voting, in which the winning party must achieve a majority of the votes in 
order to gain the seat(s) it is running for.190  While it could be argued that 
this bolsters the “tyranny of the majority,” majority rule voting could force 
the majority to occasionally acquiesce to minority viewpoints and would 
require the electorate to clearly legitimize that party.191  As it stands now, 
first-past-the-post regional elections allow the majority party to ignore 
minority party positions.192 
Russia’s regions should also reinstate the “votes against all” category 
on their ballots.  This category, while seeming perhaps merely symbolic, 
would operate as a clear protest of the status quo, and could restore voters’ 
perception that their voices matter.193  The drawback of “votes against all” 
categories is the unlikely chance that they will result in a failure to elect any 
person to a position. 194   Nevertheless, the use of a “votes against all” 
category would represent a small step which would allow Russian voters an 
opportunity to voice their displeasure with candidates or the government in 
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general, and to do so anonymously.195  Furthermore, publishing these votes 
to the public could encourage other forms of dissent.  
Finally, minimum turnout thresholds should be imposed upon regional 
elections.  Minimum turnout thresholds are designed to ensure that a 
particular candidate does not win by default, and that candidates are not 
incentivized to discourage citizens from exercising their franchise in voting.  
This simple reform would force Russia’s regional candidates to achieve a 
true mandate from voters, and would also simply support participation in the 
electoral process, and therefore democracy, by Russians.196 
3. Russia Should Restore Democratic Presidential Elections by 
Engaging in Normative and Electoral Reform 
 The democracy of presidential elections should be restored by 
abolishing the practice of anointing successors, increasing coverage of 
opposition candidates, and minimizing state involvement in campaigns.  
First and foremost, the practice of effectively “anointing successors,” should 
be abolished.  Anointing successors not only discourages voters by signaling 
that the President has already chosen a successor, but it also gives the 
anointed candidate an unfair advantage, by catapulting their publicity 
campaign and putting the force of the Kremlin behind them.  Furthermore, in 
a state in which opposition is seldom tolerated, anointing successors is likely 
to discourage minority candidates from expending time and capital to 
overcome the anointed successor’s advantage.197  Consequently, the practice 
should simply be legally abolished. 
 To further bolster the democracy of presidential elections, media 
outlets in Russia should make a point of covering opposition candidates, 
who are at a major disadvantage when it comes to disseminating their 
message and reaching voters.  While Putin and United Russia’s control over 
conventional press sources likely render this infeasible through traditional 
outlets, social networking sites, and blogs could help remedy this problem.  
The existence of Vkontakte, Russia’s largest social networking site, 
evidences the viability of this option.  In the future, however, it would also 
be advisable for the Kremlin to relinquish control of traditional media 
outlets.198   
 Finally, state involvement in campaigns for president should be 
minimized.  Specifically, state resources should not be used to fund or 
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support particular candidates’ campaigns.  Like abolishing political 
anointment of successors, minimizing state involvement will help ensure 
that no candidate receives the unfair advantage of a state mandate.  
Furthermore, it will remove the fear of voters that choosing a candidate not 
endorsed by the Kremlin will not meet with retribution by authorities.  
Together, this reform, along with the abolishment of the practice of 
anointing successors and coverage of minority candidates, will simply 
ensure that voters have a real choice when it comes to presidential elections, 
and that they will not be afraid to exercise their franchise freely. 
B. Legislative and Constitutional Changes Can Restore the Separation of 
Powers, Federalism, and Party Development in Russia 
 While restoring democracy is the first step away from autocracy and 
toward restoration of the 1993 Constitution, democracy in Russia should be 
safeguarded by restoring the separation of powers, federalism, and party 
development in Russia.  The separation of powers in Russia can be restored 
by weakening the executive branch of government and strengthening the 
other branches.  Federalism can be restored by retracting Putin’s regional 
electoral reforms and by eliminating the office of the polpredy.  Finally, 
party development can be improved by breaking-up United Russia, fostering 
the development of minority parties, and rejecting political patronage.   
1. Russians Should Amend their Constitution to Weaken the Executive 
Branch and Strengthen the Judicial and Legislative Branches, Thereby 
Restoring the Separation of Powers 
 To bolster legislative reforms, Russians should consider amending the 
1993 Constitution to weaken the executive branch and strengthen other 
branches.  This would take considerable political effort, 199  but would 
nevertheless help restore the Constitution’s safeguards of separation of 
powers.  First, the clause of the Constitution giving the President the power 
to formally propose legislation should be removed.200  This would require 
more widespread support before the President’s policies are introduced and 
insulate legislators from presidential control and over-influence. 
Furthermore, a recent amendment to the Constitution, which extended 
presidential terms from four to six years, should be removed. 201   As 
described above, the ability of a president to remain in office for twelve 
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consecutive years may come to mirror some of the terms of the Soviet 
autocrats, ensuring, therefore, that the president is not challenged politically 
by minority or alternative viewpoints for an additional two years. 202  
Shortening the length of presidential terms could enhance political discourse 
by allowing other voices to enter the political arena more often.   
Finally, the Constitution should be amended to impose term limits on 
the president.  As it stands, a Russian president is limited only to two 
consecutive terms.203  This means that, as Putin has done, a president can 
briefly relinquish power without losing his or her political power or control, 
and that interim presidents assume the presidency only symbolically.204  As a 
state with a long and arduous history of autocracy, and which has fought 
constantly against falling into autocracy once more, shorter term limits 
appear the most immediate avenue for Russia to avoid acquiescing to its 
autocratic tendencies once more.   
Regardless of whether the political remedies suggested above are 
enacted, long-lasting reform will require fundamental legal reconstructions.  
First, therefore, Russians should retract Putin’s election legislation which 
has consolidated power in the Kremlin and undermined direct elections.205  
Second, Russians should amend the 1993 Constitution to reinstate the 
structural safeguards of the separation of powers and federalism.  Together, 
these changes could protect Russia from experiencing another constitutional 
crisis.206   
2. Retracting Putin’s Regional Electoral Reforms and Eliminating the 
Office of the Polpredy Will Restore Federalism in Russia 
A restoration of the Constitution’s remedial safeguards should also be 
achieved by reestablishing federalism in Russia.  This can be achieved 
through the repeal of Putin’s regional electoral changes and through the 
elimination of the regional polpredy.  The December 2011 parliamentary 
elections, discussed in Part III.A.2, may have given the legislature the ability 
to rescind the changes, in particular the legislation which established 
presidential appointment for regional governors and consolidated power in 
the political party United Russia.207   
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As discussed above, Putin oversaw the passage of legislation that 
ensures regional governors now serve the interests of the president.  First, he 
pushed through legislation that requires presidential approval of candidates 
nominated for governor, and gave the president the power to appoint 
governors.208  Additionally, he facilitated the passage of a federal law that 
discharged the governors of their duty to appear at the capitol more than 
once a month.209  In order for governors to be truly representative of their 
districts, this legislation should be repealed.  Doing so will help ensure that 
the governors now represent the people’s interests, and not the 
President’s.210   
Furthermore, changes to the composition of the Council of the 
Federation, brought about particularly by the fact that the governors, and not 
the people now each appoint a representative to the Kremlin, have diluted 
direct representation, and caused the upper chamber of Russia’s legislature 
to be controlled by the Kremlin. 211   This has been reflected in the 
compliance and passivity of the upper chamber of the Council.212  Those 
legislators committed to democracy should restore direct election of 
governors’ representatives in Russia’s people.  This would bring about a 
return to government by the people.   
As described above, Putin created the office of the polpredy for each 
of the seven super-districts in Russia, during his time as President.213  The 
polpredy oversee the seven Russian districts, acting as watchdogs of the 
president, supervising implementation of federal laws, and providing 
information to the president. 214   The offices of the polpredy should be 
abolished.  Doing so will remove a level of oversight by the Kremlin, 
allowing the seven districts to engage in self-governance free from Kremlin 
control.215 
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3. Russia’s Multi-Party System Can Be Bolstered by Dissolving United 
Russia, Supporting the Development of Minority Parties, and Rejecting 
Excessive Political Patronage 
Primarily through political patronage, Putin and his preferred party, 
United Russia, have ensured that United Russia’s members in parliament 
vote according to the president’s will.216  Evidencing this is the fact that the 
last decade in the State Duma has seen remarkable cohesiveness in voting 
for United Russia’s representatives.217  In order to bolster the development 
of minority political parties, therefore, Russia’s leaders should reject the 
political patronage of the past and recommit to democracy.   
While democracy is occasionally susceptible to kickbacks and 
lobbying,218 United Russia’s massive consolidation of power and capital has 
ensured its control of most elective positions in Russia.219  This control by 
United Russia has allowed Putin to win some significant legislative 
victories, which have in turn compromised constitutional safeguards.220  In 
order to ensure that the legislature attains independence from Putin and that 
they represent the will of the people, the political patronage of the past 
should be limited by attitudinal changes by the legislator and, if necessary, 
legislative changes to limit the amount of acceptable patronage.221  This 
could be done through legislation, and would likely be bolstered by 
reinstating direct representation, as described below.  This would insulate 
legislators slightly from executive control imposed through United Russia.222 
Finally, because United Russia is now comprised of several political 
factions, it should consider breaking into several smaller parties.  While this 
would likely require United Russia itself to make such a change, doing so 
would bring to an end its monopoly on Russian governance and spread its 
resources among various ideologies.  More importantly, breaking up United 
Russia will dilute its power and prevent it from continuing to keep Russia in 
an indefinite autocracy.  By diffusing United Russia’s solidarity, other 
parties will be able to counterbalance control and penetrate Russian 
government with their own candidates.   
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Putin’s renewed reach for power and expected reelection demonstrate 
that Russia is experiencing a constitutional crisis.  As it stands today, the 
Constitution can do nothing to revitalize the democratic structure of 
government it created.  This is demonstrated first, by Russia’s current 
political crisis, evidenced by the demise of democracy in Russia.  Second, it 
is shown by the Constitution’s inability to remedy this crisis, which has 
resulted from a breakdown in the Constitution’s structure and requirements, 
specifically the collapse of the separation of powers, severe party 
underdevelopment, and the failure of democracy in Russia.   
Unfortunately, the Constitution contains the tools which have led to 
its weakening and allowed for incremental legislation to undermine its 
democratic safeguards.  This is only possible if Russian leaders and citizens 
experience an attitudinal change, using legislative and constitutional changes 
to restore the Constitution’s safeguards and structure.  While the struggle to 
return to democracy is likely to be arduous and slow, it is undoubtedly 
possible if Russian leaders and citizens garner the political will and strength 
to demand a return to the Constitution that they adopted in 1993.   
 
